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To Members of the Forty~fifth Colorado General Assembly:
In accordance with the provisions of House Joint
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Council submits the accompanying report and recommendations
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This report and recommendations were approved by
the Council at its meeting on November 23, 1964, for
transmission to the members of the Forty-fifth General
Assembly.
Respectfully submitted,

C. P. (Doc) Lamb,
Chairman

iii

GFFICDS

hp. C. P. (Doc) Limb
Chairmen
S.n. Fey DeBererd

COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Vice Chairman

MEMBERS

STAFF

Lt. Gov. Robert L. Knoua

Lyla C. Kyla
Olractor
Harry 0. lawaon
Senior Analyat

Sen.
Sen.
Sen.
San.

Phllllp E. Jone•
Senior Analyat

David F. Morrl111y
Ra11arch Aaalatant

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

Myran H. Schlechte

ROOM 341, STATE CAPITOL
DENVER 2, COLORADO
222-9911-EXTENSION 2285

ReHarch Anlatant
Janet Wllaon
RaaHrch AHlatant

November 4, 1964

WIiiiam E. Bladaoe
Edward J. Byrne
Frank l. GIii
Floyd Ollver

_Speaker Jo'hn D. Vanderhoof
Rep. JoHph V. CalabreH
Rep. John l. Kane
Rap. WIiiiam O. Lennox
lep. John W. Nlchola
lep. Clarence H. Quinlan

Representative C. P. Lamb, Chairman
Colorado Legislative Council
Room 341, State Capitol
Denver, Colorado
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your committee appointed to review the
uniform commercial code has completed its assignment
and submits the accompanying final report and recommendations thereon.
The committee has reviewed the draft of
the proposed uniform commercial code which has been
prepared by the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of
the Colorado Bar Association. The members of your
committee were not only impressed with the presentation
made of the code, but we were even more impressed with
the amount of work which had gone into its preparation.
We would therefore like to take this opportunity to
express our gratitude to Mr. David J. Clarke, chairman
of the bar association's committee, and to the numerous
members of his committee.
As may be noted in the accompanying report
of committee findings and recommendations, your committee recommends the favorable consideration of the
proposed code in the 1965 session. Care should be taken,
however, to retain its uniformity with the codes of other
states and, if adopted, the code should be located in
one chapter of our revised statutes.
Respectfully submitted,

JDhn W. Nichols, Chairman
Committee on Uniform
Commercial Code

FOREWORD
The Legislative Council's Committee on Uniform Commercial Code
was created under the provisions of House Joint Resolution No. 1030,
1964 regular session, with the understanding that it would essentially
be a legislative committee which would review the work of the Colorado
Bar Association's Committee on Uniform Commercial Code. Appointed to
the Legislative Council committee were Representative John W. Nichols,
chairman; Senator Carl W. Fulghum, vice chairman; Senators Donald
Kelley, Ranger Rogers, and Joe Shoemaker; and Representatives Lowell
B. Compton, T. H. Dameron, William Griffith, Frank Kemp, Ben Klein,
Vincent Massari, and Joseph Schieffelin. Representative C. P. Lamb,
chairman of the Legislative Council, also served as an ex officio
member of the committee.
The results of the work of the bar association's committee were
provided the members of the Legislative Council committee early in
October. These materials included the draft of the proposed uniform
commercial code for Colorado and related information on its contents,
and the procedures which had been followed in preparing this draft.
As a result of a two-day meeting with representatives of the bar
association's committee and other interested persons, our committee
concluded that the proposed draft should be recommended for favorable
consideration in the 1965 session.
This publication includes the report of the Legislative Council
committee on this proposal, together with accompanying explanatory
materials on the uniform commercial code; however, the proposed draft
of the code has not been included because of its size. The Colorado
Bar Association has a limited supply of these drafts, and its Uniform
Commercial Code Committee will provide these to interested persons
and groups, as well as speakers to discuss the provisions of this code.
All members of the Forty-fifth General Assembly will be provided with
drafts of the code in advance of the 1965 session.
Assisting the Legislative Council's committee were James C.
Wilson, Jr., assistant attorney general assigned to the Legislative
Reference Office, and Phillip E. Jones, senior research analyst.

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

November 4, 1964
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UNIFORM CO1WAERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE REPORT
Under the provisions of House Joint Resolution No. 1030, 1964
regular session, the Legislative Council was given discretionary
authority to appoint a committee to review the proposed uniform commercial code being prepared by the Colorado Bar Association. On the
assumption that the bar association would complete its work on a
draft of the code, the Council appointed its committee following
adjournment of the 1964 session.
Committee Procedures
Members of the Council committee met with members of the
Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Colorado Bar Association on
May 2nd, 1964, to review the study and drafting procedures which had
been worked out by the bar association committee and to hear a discussion on the uniform commercial code by a member of the New Mexico
Uniform State Laws Commission. The bar association committee reported
that the annotation work necessary for its review of the uniform commercial code was being carried out by students of the Denver University
School of Law. When this material became available, the work on the
draft itself would be conducted by subcommittees assigned various of
the ten articles of the code. (Appendix D contains a list of the
members of the bar association who worked on this project.)
The bar association committee reported that its completed
draft would be submitted to the association's Board of Governors and,
if approved, would be submitted to the Legislative Council committee
for consideration early in the fall.
The Legislative Council committee met on October 22nd and
23rd to review the bar association committee's proposed draft of a
uniform commercial code for Colorado and to provide an opportunity for
interested persons ond organizations to present their views to the committee on this draft. Much of these two days was devoted to comparing
the proposed draft with present Colorado law and to discussing technical
and procedural problems involved with the adoption of such a code in
Colorado. Few persons, other than those attorneys who had worked on
the code, appeared to discuss the proposed code with the committee.
Committee Findings
The uniform commercial code is the result of more than 20 years
of intensive study, drafting, and refining by its sponsors -- the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute in collaboration with a number of committees of
the American Bar Association and other interested groups and trade
organizations. ,~ditional study and consideration has been given this
code by the 29 states and the District of Columbia that have adopted it.
These 29 states, which include Colorado's neighboring states of New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Wyoming, are listed in the following
tabulation in the order in which they adopted the code:

State

Adoption
Date

Effective Date

Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Kentucky
Connecticut
New Hampshire

1953
1957
1958
1959
1959

July l,
October
July 1,
October
July 1,

1954
l, 1958
1960
l, 1961
1961

Rhode Island
Wyoming
Arkansas
New Mexico
Ohio

1960
1961
1961
1961
1961

January
January
January
January
July l,

2, 1962
2, 1962
l, 1962
l, 1962
1962

Oregon
Oklahoma
Illinois
New Jersey
Georgia

1961
1961
1961
1961
1962

September 1, 1963
January l, 1963
July 2, 1962
January 1, 1963
January 1, 1964

Alaska
New York
Michigan
Indiana
Tennessee

1962
1962
1962
1963
1963

January 1, 1963
September 27, 1964
January 1, 1964
July l, 1964
July 1, 1964

West Virginia
Montana
Maryland
California
Wisconsin

1963
1963
1963
1963
1963

July l, 1964
January 2, 1965
February 1, 1964
January 1, 1965
July l, 1965

Maine
Nebraska
Missouri
District of Columbia
Virginia

1963
1963
1963
1963
1964

December 31, 1964
September 2, 1965
July l, 1965
January l, 1965
January l, 1966

Appendix A contains a report prepared by the bar association
committee on the background and provisions of the uniform commercial
code. This report notes that the code consolidates in one enactment
and brings up to date and makes more certain present statutory commercial law in areas now covered by eitht old uniform acts, five of
which have been adopted in Colorado, and also a variety of other ronuniform commercial statutes. Because of easier and more rapid communication and transportation in this nation, and because industrial
empires have grown and become more decentralized and scattered in the
process, without regard to state lines, the need and demand for
uniformity in commercial law and dealings has become more pronounced.
The uniform commercial code has been prepared as an answer to this
demand.
There are a number of other reasons which have been considered
as to why the uniform commercial code · should be adopted in Colorado.
Colorado's present commercial statutory laws are outmoded and are not
- 2 -
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in keeping with modern commercial practices, and a revision thereof
would be highly desirable. These present statutes also are extremely
uncertain in many respects because of inconsistencies in the law
itself or because of inconsistent interpretations thereof, as well as
having areas where there is no statutory coverage whatsoever in this
state.
Perhaps the overriding reason for the enactment of the -code is
the fact that it has been adopted in so many states, including such
highly industrialized and commercial states as Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania,
and the commercial transactions between business and financial
institutions in these and the other 21 states and similar institutions
in Colorado would be greatly facilitated and enhanced if Colorado were
to adopt the uniform commercial code. In this connection, one of the
persons appearing before the Council committee stated that insurance
companies as well as banks are more willing to make loans in states
having the uniform commercial code.
The comparison of the proposed uniform commercial code provisions with present Colorado law, included in Appendix B, was reviewed
at length by members of the Council committee with representatives of
the bar association subcommittees which had worked on these provisions.
Because of the lack of time, the committee did not review the proposed
draft of the code section by section with these representatives; however,
the committee concluded that because of the highly-technical nature of
the substantive provisions in the code, such a review would be of
little value. Further, the committee felt that the work that had been
done by members of the bar association on the proposed code in effect
represented the same services which normally would be provided by the
committee's staff, and that the committee members must place their
faith in the work which the attorneys had done, much the same as they do
with the work of their own staff.
During the article-by-article comparison with present Colorado
law, the need for uniformity with code provisions in other states was
stressed. In this respect, bar association subcommittees had the advice
of the UCC Permanent Editorial Board and before any changes were made
in the draft for Colorado, the subcommittees would correspond with this
board for their comments. (A file of this correspondence has been kept
by the bar association.) Moreover, it was also pointed out that the
need for uniformity applies to section numbers as well as language
within the code. (Appendix E includes an article which treats this
need for uniformity in some detail.)
As a result of this comparison, the committee found that the
code draft had been exhaustively researched by the bar association committee members, as well as by others, and that its provisions had
already been reviewed by some commercial groups. The Colorado Bankers'
Association, for example, hdd adopted a resolution in support of the
adoption of the uniform commercial code by the General Assembly. The
&ar association committee plans additional exposure of its draft to
i hterested groups and associations between now and the 1965 session.

- 3 -
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Committee Recommendations
1. The committee recommends that favorable consideration be
given in the 1965 session to the"draft of the uniform commercial code
prepared by the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association. The committee believes that no further interim legislative
consideration is needed of this draft and that the members of the
General Assembly, because of the tremendous size of this proposal and
because of its highly technical nature, may agree with this committee
that the acceptance of this code will be based, to a large extent, on
faith in the abilities and knowledge of those persons who have devoted
considerable time to its preparation, not only in Colorado but in the
29 other states in the nation which have adopted this code.
2. The committee recommends that the members of the General
Assembly carefully consider any proposed amendments to the code which
would change its uniformity. Much of the advantage in adopting this
code for Colorado rests with its having uniform provisions governing
commercial actions, and hastily-drawn amendments to the proposed code
would serve to defeat this purpose, as well as possibly jeopardizing
its chances of being enacted. In the interests of uniformity with
the code as adopted in other states, the committee suggests that the
numbering system for sections as used in Colorado be retained but that
the section numbers as contained in the uniform commercial code be
included in parentheses following the Colorado section numbers.
3. The committee recommends that. if adopted. the uniform
commercial code be maintained as a separate chapter in the Colorado
Revised Statutes. The proposed code is a consolidated body of law and
should be located in our statutes as such.
4. The committee recommends that the Colorado Bar Association
continue to provide as widespread publicity as possible to interested
groups and associations on the provisions in the proposed uniform
commercial code. Because of its size, this report does not include
a copy of the proposed code, but the bar association has a number of
prepared copies and it has speakers available for any group or association interested in discussing this proposal.
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APPENDIX A
(Prepared by the Uniform Commercial Code Committee
of the Colorado Bar Association)
WHAT VERY BRIEFLY IS THE CODE?
The uniform commercial code consolidates in one enactment and
brings up to date and makes more certain our present statutory commercial law in areas now covered by eight old uniform acts, five of
which were adopted in Colorado, and also by a variety of other nonuniform commercial statutes.
It consists of ten articles, Article l contains general
provisions and definitions common to the entire code. Article 10
contains the formal effective date and repealer provisions.
Between these two articles are eight other· articles, each dealing with a specific and particular phase of commercial activity and
substantive commercial law. The concept of the code is that "commercial
transactions" is a single subject of the law notwithstanding its many
facets.
The basic and essential fact of all commerce·, the focal point
of all commercial activity, is the sale and purchase of · goods. Article
2 entitled ''Sales" deals therewith. Payment for the goods sold may be
through the medium of a check, note or draft. Article 3 · is entitled
"Commercial Paper'' and covers such instruments. Th~ ch~ck, note or
draft or other similar paper, _ may be negotiated and p;ass through one or
more banks for collection. Article 4 entitled "Bank Deposits and
Coll~ctions" supplements Article 3 in this respect. The sale may be
pursuant to a letter of credit and Article 5 deals with and is entitled
"Letters of Credit". The sale of the goods may be in ordinary course
of business or may possibly be a bulk transfer. Article 6 entitled
"Bulk Transfers" covers this type of transaction. Transportation or
storage of the goods sold may entail the use of a bill of lading or
warehouse receipt or both. Hence Article 7 entitled "Documents of
Title" is included to cover such arrangements. Since Article 3 dealing
with commercial paper excludes certain defined investment securities,
Article 8 entitled "Investment Securities" is included to cover investment paper. The goods, as well as other types of personal property,
either in the hands of the seller or the buyer, before, a~ part of or
after sale may serve as collateral for security purposes, and hence
the code includes Article 9 entitled "Secured Transactions.~
Every phase of commerce involved is but a part of one transaction, namely, the sale of and payment for the goods. The code deals
with all the phases which may ordinarily arise in the handling of a
commercial transaction, from start to finish.
THE ORIGIN~ REASONS THEREFOR, AND DRAFTING OF THE CODE
This code represents more than twenty years of intensive
study, drafting and refining by its jponsors, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
- 5 -

in collaboration with a number of committees of the American Bar Association and other interested groups and trade organizations. Over this
period of time, thousands of lawyers, law school professors, judges and
business men have played a part, ·some large, some small, in the development of this final product.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
is a body of three to five lawyers from each state which was originally
organized in the 1890's to promote uniformity of State legislation.
Since its organization, the commissioners have promulgated over orae
hundred uniform acts, including a number in the field of commercial
law. The first was the Negotiable Instruments Act promulgated in
1896, followed, among others, by the Sales Act and the Warehouse
Receipts Act, both in 1906, the Bills of Lading Act and the Stock
Transfer Act, both in 1909, the Conditional Sales Act in 1918, the
Fiduciaries Act in 1922, and the Trust Receipts Act in 1933.
Colorado has never enacted the Bills of Lading Act, the Trust
Receipts Act, or the Conditional Sales Act.
Since promulgation of the above mentioned uniform acts, mostly
over fifty years ago, only the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Warehouse Receipts Act have been enacted in all American jurisdictions.
However, with respect to the former, approximately eighty instances of
conflicting interpretation by the courts have been documented so that
uniformity even in this area of universal enactment is really nonexistent. With respect to the latter, uniform amendments promulgated
in 1922 have been adopted in only about sixteen jurisdictions so that
in this area again there is no real uniformity.
The Sales Act has been enacted in about thirty-six jurisdictions,
but again uniform amendments promulgated in 1922 have been adopted in
only eleven of these thirty-six jurisdictions so that there is no
uniformity in this area.
The mere age of these various acts indicates the real need for
revision. It is also obvious from their lack of wide acceptance that
piece-meal proposals or separate revisions of the existing uniform acts
will not promote uniformity of legislation.
Aside from these uniform acts there are innumerable other
statutes dealing with commercial subjects but with substantial differences
among the states. For example, there is the Bank Collection Code enacted
in Colorado in 1957. That code was based upon the recommended code of
the American Bankers A~sociation. There also is a great variety of
chattel security statutes such as those relating to chattel mortgages,
factor's liens, trust receipts, and many other types of lien statutes.
As far back as the 1920's. dissatisfaction with the Uniform
Sales Act reached the stage of public expression. Uniform amendments
promulgated in 1922 did not solve all of the problems. Continued and
growing dissatisfaction culminated in the drafting of a revision to
apply to and regulate interstate sales only. This revision was introduced in the Congress of the United States in 1940 (H.R. 8176, 76th
Congress, 2nd Session).
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It was thought the enactment of this measure, applicable to
interstate sales, would compel the states to adopt a similar revision.
Obviously, if this did not happen~ a statute regulating interstate
sales only would create a chaotic condition, worse than the existing
evil, with one set of laws governing interstate sales and another
set governing intrastate sales, with considerable doubt at the
inception of any given transaction as to which law applied.
It was
this agitation for reform that triggered the idea ~fa uniform .commercial code to revise not only the Uniform Sales Act but other
commercial statutes as well which from mere lapse of time had become
out-moded. Out of this came the arrangement in 1940 between the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute to undertake the study and drafting necessary to develop the
code.
As we more and more after 1900 became ''One Country" by reason
of easier and more rapid communication and and transportation, as our
industrial empire grew and expanded and in the process became more
decentralized and scattered without reference to state lines, the need
and demand for uniformity in commercial areas became more pronounced.
The sponsoring organizations in 1940 assembled a research
staff under a chief reporter with ample financial aid secured from the
Falk Foundation. The preliminary research to determine existing law
and actual commercial practices was done by the staff which in turn
reported with a draft of the proposed statutory provision to an advisory
committee of lawyers, judges, law school professors, and business
people. After discussion and criticism at this level, the matter would
be referred back to the staff for reworking to come again to the advisory
committee. This was a continuing back and forth process over many
years and in its normal routine thousands of persons were consulted,
conf~icting views reconciled, etc.
At least twice a year, when the drafting had reached a point
for presentation to the entire membership of the commissioners, it was
so submitted and again underwent critical scrutiny. The same process
of submission was followed frequently with the Council of the Law
Institute and at least once a year with the membership of that institute.
The sales article was initially completed around 1942. The
remaining work was slowed somewhat by reason of the war but was undertaken afresh in 1945. It was at this time that various committees of
the American Bar Association interested themselves in the project for
the purpose of scrutinizing the work being done.
The code as a completely integrated whole made its first appearande in 1949. Objection to this first draft resulted in a complete
re-examination of the project, with public hearings being held by the
editorial board of the sponsoring organizations. From 1949 to 1952 the
code went through several complete revisions and then in 1952 was
finally approved by the commissioners and the Law Institute and the
American Bar Association. It was this draft which was enacted in
Pennsylvania in 1953, effective July 1, 1954.
This enactment lead to official minute and detailed studies of
the code in a number of other states: The most thorough of these was
that conducted by the New York Law Revision Commission with an appropria- 7 -

tion in excess of $100,000. The New York Commission assembled a staff
of experts not previously identified with the code project and took
approximately three years to con~lude its study of the 19S2 draft. Its
conslusion with respect to that draft was that the code was a ~orth~
while undertaking that th~ codification of law in the commercial field
was desirable bui that the draft then under consideration was not yet
in sati sf acto;y form for enactment, al though the commission did .approve
of many of the basic and fundamental theories underlying the code. Of
course, since then the code was revised in 1958 and this revision was
enacted in New York in 1962.
In addition to the New York and equally-detailed studies in
other states, the Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce initiated a
program of re-examination of the code through a committee representing
all segments of commerce, industry and banking in that state.
At the same time the
editorial board which set up
various articles of the code
collaboration with the other

sponsoring organizations enlarged their
several subcommittees with respect to the
for purposes of a re-consideration in
studies then being made.

All of this rather intensive activity resulted in the 19~8
Revised Code which with the 1962 changes is embodied in the act recommended by the committee.

THE REASONS FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE
CODE BY YOUR COMMITTEE
l. Practically all of our present commercial statutory law was
drafted, promulgated, and enacted more than fifty years ago. Since then
there has been a tremendous growth in commercial activity and many new
patterns and practices have developed. In short, these present statutes
are outmoded, are not in keeping with current commercial practices, and
a revision thereof is highly desirable.
2. Our present commercial statutory law is in many respects
extremely uncertain because of inconsistencies in the law itself or
because of inconsistent interpretations thereof. There are also areas
where there is no statutory coverage whatsoever.
For example, any attempt to predetermine rights or risks in a
sales transaction under the Uniform Sales Act is uncertain where such
rights or risks depend on who has title to the goods since this in
turn depends on the presumed intent of the parties to be determined
factually.
In addition to the above-mentioned almost eighty instances where
conflicting interpretations have developed in the area of negotiable
instruments, there is uncertainty as to whether the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act applies to corporate debt obligations which do not
literally conform to the statutory requirements for negotiability but
as to which there are substantial economic reasons why they should be
treated as negotiable.
Aside from the need for modernizing, there is a real need for a
revision of our commercial statutes in the interest of simplicity,
clarity, and certainty.
-
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Section 1-107 provides that any claim or right arising out of
an alleged breach can be discharged in whole, or in part, without consideration by a written waiver ~r renunciation signed and delivered
by the aggrieved party. This probably constitutes a change in the
law of Colorado.
Article I also contains general definitions and principles of
interpretation. Special definitions for succeeding articles are set
forth in those articles. The words defined will be discussed in
connection with their use throughout the code; their meaning in the
abstract has no significance.
Section 1-206 provipes a statute of frauds limitation of
$5,000 for personal property other than (1) goods as defined in Section
2-201 (where the limitation is $500), or (2) securities where no dollar

limitation is set forth (Section 8-319), or (3) security agreements
which have no dollar limitation (Sectio~ 9-203). The statute of frauds
relating to the sale of goods will increase the amount from $50 to $500.
The adoption of the uniform commercial code in Colorado would
require the repeal of the following uniform acts and other laws which
were adopted in Colorado on the dates indicated, as well as miscellaneous other statutes:
Uniform Sales Act
Negotiable Instruments Law
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act
Uniform Stock Transfer Act
Uniform Fiduciaries Act
Bulk Sales Act, as amended in
Colorado Banking Code, as amended in
Chattel Mortgage Laws

1941
1897

1911
1927

1923
1961
1957

In general, present Colorado statutes do not contain statements
of principles of the kind discussed above. To the extent that such
principles will become a part of our statutory law if the code is
adopted in Colorado, they will constitute new guides for the supreme
court in cases involving interpretations of the succeeding articles.
ARTICLE 2 - SALES
I.

What Article 2 does.

Article 2 applies to transactions in sales of goods. "Goods"
includes movables and growing crops and such items as timber and
minerals when they are to be removed from the real estate by the seller.
It does not include non-movables, investment securities and rights of
action or transfers which are intended only as security.
II.

Formation of Contract.

A. Statute of Frauds. The writing relied on to satisfy the
statute of frauds is not insufficient merely because it omits or
incorrectly states the terms. The only limitation is that the contract
is not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods shown in the writing.

- 11 -

As between 11 merchants 11 (that is, persons familiar with this
type of transaction) when a letter confirming the contract is received,
failure to deny in writing withi~ ten days will render the letter a
sufficient writing against the recipient as well as the sender.
As to part payment and also part acceptance, the code permits
enforcement of an oral contract only to the extent of the goods paid
for and accepted as opposed to the existing law whereupon enforcement
and the entire contract would result.
Contracts subject to the statute of frauds would be those
greater than $500 as opposed to the present law of $50.
B. Indefiniteness. A contract will not fail for indefiniteness
even though one or more terms are left open, provided that there is a
reasonably certain basis for · supply the missing term.
C, Firm Offers. A written promise to hold an offer open will
be enforced according to its terms for a period not to exceed three
months if the promise is made and signed by the "merchant" even if the
offer is not supported by independent consideration.

D. Counter-Offers. The effect of an acceptance is not destroyed though additional terms are stated, unless the acceptance is expressly
made conditional on the offerors assent to the additional terms. The
additional terms are viewed as mere proposals for additions to the contract except that, where the parties are merchants then the additional
terms do not materially alter the original offer, the additional terms
become part of the contract unless the other party indicates his
objections within a reasonable time.
E. Acceptance of Offer - Generally, Offers are to be construed
as inviting acceptance in any reasonable manner, rejecting the requirements that the acceptince be transmitted by the same medium by which
the offer was made.
F, Unilateral Contracts. The offeree has no power to accept
by performance unless he notifies the offerer within a reasonable time
that he intends to accept. When the offerer asks for current shipment,
shipment of non-conforming goods constitutes both an acceptance and a
breach.
G, Modification of Contract, An agreement made in good faith
modifying a contract does not need consideration to be binding.
III,

Interpretation and Performance,

A, Assignments, 1. Rights. Unless the contract expressly
prohibits assignment of rights, or unless the assignment would materially
increase the other party's burdens, all rights of buyer or seller may
be assigned. Rights arising from the other party's breach of contract
or from the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation may be
assigned despite contrary provisions in the contract.
2. Duties may be assigned if .the other party has no substantial
interest in having the assignor perform personally.
- 12 -

B.

Warranties. 1. Types of( Warranties. a. Express Warranties. Express warranties include the warilanty that the goods
will be of the type dese.ribed in the contlraot and the similar warranty that the goods will conform to any, sample or model which was
the basis for the contract. The code d~parts from the sales act in
omitting any requirement that the buyer prove his reliance upon an
express warranty.
b. Warranties of Title. The sel,ter implied! y warrants that
he has power to convey good title and that the goods will be delivered
free of any encumbrance unknown to the buyer at the time of contracting
and that the goods will be delivered free of any claim or infringement
except when the goods have been manufactured in compliance with specifications furnished by the buyer.
·
c. Implied Warranties. (1) Warranty of Merchantability. A
warranty of merchantability arises whenever goods are sold by a person
whose occupation is to sell goods of that type. Merchantability is
the fair average quality of and uniformity and specifically includes
food or drink to be consumed on the premises.
(2) Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose. This arises
when a seller has reason to know that the buyer intends to use the
goods for a particular purpose and the buyer is relying on the seller's
skill or judgment.
2. Persons to whom Warranties Extend. The code leaves the
privity questions for a case to case determination except that a seller's warranties extend to the family and household of the buyer and
certain quests if it is reasonable to expect that such a person may
use the goods.
3. Limitation of Warranties. A court is permitted to refuse
to enforce any clause of a contract that was unconscionable at the time
it was made. This concept of unconscionability probably does not refer
to comparative bargaining power but to prevention of unfair surprise.
Apart from the unconscionability section, the code sets out specifically
the manner in which each type of warranty may be limited.
An express warranty and a limitation of warranty liability are
to be construed as consistent, if possible, but when such construction
is impossible the express warranty will prevail.
The implied warranty of title (and the warranty against infringement) can be excluded or modified by specific language or by certain circumstances, such as sales under execution or by foreclosing
lienors, indicating that the seller intends to sell only on a quit-claim
basis.
Other implied warranties can be excluded or modified by the
trade usage or course of dealings and by expressions such as "with all
faults." If the limitation is in writing, the writing must be conspicuous and the warranty of fitness for a particular use can be limited
only in writing.
C. Delivery. When the contract is entirely silent as to
delivery, the place of delivery is the seller's place of business.
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When the goods are in the hands of a bailee and the goods are not to
be moved, tender of delivery is achieved by tender to the buyer of a
negotiable document of title or QY the bailee's acknowledgment of the
buyer's rights to possession. When the goods are to be given to a
carrier the delivery obligation depends upon whether the contract is a
shipment contract or a destination contract. The determination as to
whether a contract is a shipment or destination contract does not
depend upon which party pays the shipping costs. Rather, contracts are
presumed to be shipment contracts until the contrary is proven.
D. Consequences of Non-Conforming Delivery. If delivery fails
in any respect to conform to the contract the buyer may reject the
tender in part or in whole. This is, however, limited as follows:
1. Cure. Until the time for performance has expired, the
seller may "cure" by subsequent tender of conforming delivery. After
the expiration of the time for performance the seller is entitled to
cure if he had reason to believe that the original tender would have
been acceptable. A non-conformity capable of cure must be communicated
by the buyer to the seller with specificity.
2. Substantial performance. Once a buyer has accepted the
goods, he may revoke acceptance only if the nonconformity substantially
impairs the value of the contract. In an installment contract the
buyer may reject only the nonconforming installment unless the nonconformity, together with any prior nonconformities that may have occurred,
substantially impairs the value of the entire contract.
3. Substituted performance. If the goods are damaged without
fault of either party and before risk of loss has passed to the buyer,
the buyer may cancel the contract or accept the goods with due allowance
in the price, but he may not treat the contract as breached. When delivery is delayed or rendered commercially impractical by an event
whose non-occurrence was a basic as$umption of the contract, the buyer
has the alternative of cancelling the contract or of accepting a reduced
or delayed performance. However, no breach will have occurred. When
the agreed manner of delivery has become commercially impractical, the
buyer must accept a reasonable substitute.
E. Risk of Loss and Insurable Interest. Risk of loss hinged
on the location of "title'' is rejected under the code; rather, risk of
loss is governed by the delivery obligation, in the absence of breach
or contrary agreement.
Where the seller breaches a contract by tendering nonconforming
goods, the risk of loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance.
However, once the buyer has accepted, even though he may rightfully revoke acceptance, risk of loss rests on seller only to the extent the
buyer's insurance is adequate. Correspondingly, when prior to delivery
the buyer breaches a contract, risk of loss passes to buyer only to
the extent that the seller's insurance is inadequate.
The buyer's insurable interest arises as soon as existing goods
are identified to the contract and the seller's insurable interest
continues so long as the seller retains any security interest in the
goods.
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F. Payment. Payment is presumed to be due only after the
buyer has had an opportunity to inspect the goods.
When the contract calls for payment against documents, the
buyer is not entitled to inspect before payment is due. The payment
here in no way limits the buyer's remedies if the goods are nonconforming.
Any manner of payment may be used which is current in the
ordinary course of business. Payment by check is conditional upon
honor on due presentment.
G. Assurance of Performance. A buyer or seller who has
reasonable ground for doubting the ability or willingness of the other
party to perform may demand adequate assuranc_e of performance from the
other party.
IV.

Remedies.

A. Acceptance. Acceptance occurs whenever, after a reasonable
opportunity to inspect, the buyer notifies the seller that the goods
are conforming or that the goods will be accepted despite conformity.
The buyer will be deemed to have accepted the goods if he fails to
object within a reasonable time or if he treats the goods in a manner
inconsistent with the seller's ownership.
B. Sellers's Remedy in the Absence of Acceptance. If the
buyer's rejection is proper, the buyer must nevertheless hold the goods
under reasonable care for a long enough time to permit removal by the
seller. h'hen the buyer deals in goods of the type rejected, he must
honor reasonable instructions from the seller as to disposition of the
good·s and, in the absence of such instructions, he must sell the goods
for the seller's account if the goods are subject to rapid decline in
value.

When the buyer has breached the contract without having accepted the goods, the seller's remedies fall into two categories:
1. Remedies which reach directly to the goods themselves -the seller may withhold delivery or if the goods are in the hands of a
bailee he may, as against the buyer, "stop in transit" at any time
prior to delivery. If the breach occurs before the manufacture of the
goods has been completed, the seller may complete the goods without
violating any rule against litigation or damages. If the buyers breach
occurs when he is insolvent, the seller, under certain circumstances,
may recover the goods even after delivery and acceptance.
2. Remedies which allow monetary damages -- the seller has
the alternative of suing for damages as computed by ''resale," or of
suing for "damages for non-acceptance." As to the former, on learning
of the breach, the seller may, subject to specified safeguards, sell
the goods at public or private sale, and then sue for the difference
between the contract price and the resale price. The seller may retain
any profit. Alternatively the seller may sue for "damages for nonacceptance," such damages being measured by the difference between the
contract price and the market price at time and place for delivery,
allowing such additional damages as necessary to put the seller in as
- 15 -

good a position as he would have been had there been performance. An
action for price is not permitted unless it can be shown that resale
is impossible or that the goods have been damaged after risk of loss
has passed to the buyer.
C. Sellers Remedies on Acceptance. Once the goods have been
accepted, the seller has standing to maintain an action for the price
even though the seller may have also breached the contract. The
buyer's claim must be asserted by way of counterclaim rather than defense.
D. Buyer's Remedies in the Absence of Acceptance. 1. Remedies
reaching goods. a. Goods rejected for non-conformity. The buyer is
given a possessory security interest to the extent of payments on the
purchase price, inspection costs, and expenses incurred pursuant to the
buyer's duty to dispose of rightfully rejected goods. To satisfy this
security interest, the buyer has the rights of resale.
b. Specific Performance. Buyer has a right to obtain specific
goods identified to the contract if comparable goods cannot be procured
elsewhere or if they have been "shipped under reservation 11 and payment
has been tendered.
2. Damages. The buyer is given the alternative of suing for
damages as computed by 11 cover 11 or for "damages for non-delivery."
"Cover" is the buyer's right to purchase substitute goods within a
reasonable time after learning of the seller's breach. He may th~n sue
the seller for the difference between the cover price and the contract
price. 11 Damages for non-delivery" are defined as the difference between
the market price at the time the buyer learned of the breach and the
contract price. This changes the existing law which provided that the
relevant market price was that prevailing at the time delivery should
have been made. Additionally, the buyer may also recover consequential
damages which are any losses resulting from the buyer's business position which the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting.
The buyer is under duty to mitigate consequential damages.
E. Buyer's Remedies after Acceptance. The measure of damages
is the loss resulting in ordinary course from the breach. Where the
defect is also a breach of warranty, the measure of damages normally
to be applied is the difference between the value of the goods as warranted and the value as accepted. Value is computed as of the time and
place of acceptance. Consequential damages may also be recovered.
F. Contractual Limitations on Remedies. A reasonable amount
of liquidated damages is permitted. Also, the parties may limit the
type of remedies that may be resorted to, although when circumstances
cause a limited remedy to fail of its purpose, the limitation may be
repudiated. Parties are permitted to limit or exclude consequential

damages, but such limitations are expressly subject to the "unconscion-

ability section."

G. Statute of Limitations. An action for breach of any contract for sale of goods must be commenced within four years rather than
the six-year period which is now the law in Colorado. Furthermore, by
the original agreem~nt the parties may reduce the period of limitations
to not less than one year, but may not extend the period.
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V.

Third Persons.

A. Creditors of the Seller. A buyer who has paid a part of
of the price for goods identified to the contract may recover the
goods from the seller on tender of the balance of the price, provided
that the seller has become insolvent within ten days after he first
received payment from the buyer. This right to recover the goods is
superior to the rights of the seller's creditors, except for rights
they obtain under Article 9 of the code, or unless the identification
of the goods to the contract, or the seller's retention of possession,
amounts to a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference. The uniform
code would subject the recl~iming seller to prior rights of a lien
creditor. The Colorado proposal follows the code as enacted in New
York, California, Illinois, New Mexico, and Maine and which does not
give the lien creditor this superior right. This will avoid changing
the existing Colorado law as found in In re Appel Suit and Cloak Co.,
198 F. 2d 322 and see In re Kravitz, 278 F. 2d 820.
B. The Creditors of the Buyer. A seller may recover goods
received on credit by the buyer when insolvent if demand for the goods
is made within ten days after the goods are received. If, however,
the seller has received from the buyer a written misrepresentation of
solvency within three months prior to delivery of the goods, then the
ten-day limitation does not apply. This right is superior to the
right of the buyer's creditors unless these creditors have a security
interest.
Sellers can no longer rely on the so-called "sale on consignment" to protect their security interests in goods sold for resale.
A sale where title is purported to be reserved in the seller until
resale does not give the seller or consignor a right superior to the
buyer's creditors unless there is compliance with Article 9.
C. Good Faith Purchases From the_Buyer. The seller's power
to recover the goods is defeated by resale to a buyer who has no
knowledge of the seller's interest and who purchases in the ordinary
course of the business.
ARTICLE 3 - COMMERCIAL PAPER
Article 3 of the uniform commercial code is a precise and
concise revision of the oldest of the uniform laws, the Negotiable
Instruments Law, which was adopted in Colorado in 1897. Changes in
commercial language and practice during the nearly 70 years since the
NIL was drafted, together with inconsistent court interpretations of
many sections causing a lack of uniformity in the law, have resulted in
a need for an up-dating of that statute. Article 3 is thoroughly
integrated with the remainder of the code so that the rules governing
the law of commercial paper are part of a consistent pattern of commercial law.
Although Article 3 of the code is considerably shorter than
the NIL, the logical arrangement of the sections makes it an easier
statute to work with than the NIL. This contribution, perhaps most
significant in Article 3, overshadows any changes in the law effected
by the article, although such changes do exist, some of the more
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significant of which are noted below. Article 3 continues the policy
of the NIL of promoting the free flow of commercial paper which is
used so extensively as a substitute for money.
The following sections of the code may be noted as either
changing the law of the NIL or specifying a rule where none existed
under the NIL:
1. UCC Section 3-105 sets forth rules as to when a promise or
order is unconditional (a requirement of negotiability), and provides
that a reference in an instrument to some other document does not
render the promise or order conditional unless the instrument is specifically made "subject to" the other document.
2. UCC Section 3-109 resolves certain problems which arose
under the NIL as to the negotiability of an instrument the payable
date of which is subject to acceleration or extension, favoring negotiability in both instances. However, the NIL rule that an instrument
is negotiable which is payable upon an event uncertain as to time of
occurrence is reversed.
3. The committee has recommended adoption of alternative B of
UCC Section 3-121 providing that "A note or acceptance which states
that it is payable at a bank is not of itself an order or authorization
to the bank to.pay it. 11 Although this reverses the rule of CRS 1953,
95-1-87, it conforms to the rule adopted by the majority of the .
western states which have adopted the code and is believed to conform
to the actual practice followed by Colorado banks.
4. UCC Section 3-204 changes the "once bearer paper always
bearer paper" rule under the NIL. See CRS 1953, 95-1-40. Under UCC
Section 3-204 any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable to the
order of the special indorsee and may be further negotiated only by ·
his indorsement.
5. UCC Section 3-302 defines the requirements of a holder in
due course, eliminating the requirement that the instrument be complete and regular on its face, but achieves much the same result in
that it must be ·taken "in good faith." Subsection (2) states that a
payee may be a holder in due course, resolving the question which
existed under the NIL.
6. UCC Section 3-304 is more explicit than CRS 1953, 95-1-55
and 56, as to what constitutes notice of a defect prohibiting a
purchaser from obtaining the status of a holder in due course.
7. UCC Section 3-406 is new and places the burden of loss
resulting from a material alteration or unauthorized signature on any
party who, by his negligence, contributes to the alteration or making
of the unauthorized signature.
8. UCC Sections 3-501 to 3-511 combine ~·great many NIL
sections into a unified presentation of ~11 rules concerning presentment, notice of dishonor, protest, and the rights based thereon. Few
substantive rules are changed. In one significant change, UCC Section
3-510 provides that if an instrument is not acce~ted within the required time after presentment, it is considered dishonored rather than
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constructively accepted as under CRS 1953, 95-2-12.

See UCC Section

3-506.
9. UCC Section 3-802 is new and provides that, unless otherwise agreed, an instrument taken for an underlying obligation suspends
the obligation until the instrument is due. Subsection (2), however,
specifies that taking of a non-postdated check in good faith does not
of itself extend the time on the original obligation so as to discharge a surety.

Upon adoption of Article 3 of the Code, Articles 1 through 4
of Chapter 95 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, should be repealed.
ARTICLE 4 - BANK DEPOSITS and COLLECTIONS
Article 4 of the uniform commercial code provides uniform
rules to govern the collection by banks of checks and other instruments for the payment of money, while preserving flexibility for the
development of improved methods of collecting such items. The article
also contains rules governing the relationship of banks with depositors
in connection with the collection and payment of items.
Uniform law in this area is a necessity: Individual Federal
Reserve banks process as many as 1,000,000 items a day, and the larger
banks in Denver in excess of 200,000 a day. Banks with le,s than
$5,000,000 on deposit handle from 1,000 to 2,000 items daily.
Bank collections in Colorado are now governed primarily by the
provisions of CRS 14-18-1 et seq., enacted in 1957 and based largely
upon the Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers Association
(as well as the ABA' s i'Aodel Deferred Posting Statute). The Bank
Collection Code has been vigorously attacked in other sections of the
country on the ground that it was drafted with a view to protecting
collecting banks from liability to the nonbanking public for any mishaps that might occur during the collection process and on the ground
that its draftsmanship is "fifth rate."
The provisions of Article 4 are intended to answer the criticisms mentioned in the above paragraph. Other often-mentioned advantages are:
(1) Items in the process of bank collection today -- involving
more than a billion transactions daily -- almost invariably cross state
lines and a truly comprehensive and uniform act setting forth the basic
rights of the parties concerned in any bank collection is badly needed;
and
(2) An opportunity is presented to codify into law a number of
desirable collection practices and the results of beneficial case law,
to prohibit or at least limit other collection practices deemed undesirable, and to reject less desirable case law.
Article 4 does not fundament~lly change the rights and o~ligations flowing from the provisions of CRS 14-18-1 et seq. A possible
exception to this Section 4-403(2), which states that a customer's oral
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stop payment order is bindiDg on a bank for 14 calendar days. Existing
Colorado law does not allow such oral orders. The committee believes
that provision recognizes a practice followed by a great many banks in
Colorado; and that banks which do not care to honor such oral orders
may vary the effect of this provision by an agreement to the contrary
on signature cards or other contracts with its depositors. Such
variation is allowed by Section 4-103(1) of the Code.
ARTICLE 5 - LETTERS OF CREDIT
Colorado has no statutory or case law relating to letters of
credit. A letter of credit is defined in the code as a contract under
which a bank or some other person undertakes, at the request of its
customer, to honor drafts or other demands for payment for a period of
time by the beneficiary named in the contract, upon presentation by
that person of certain prescribed documents. The principal function
of a letter of credit is to finance the movement of goods and assure
the seller, who is normally the beneficiary of the credit, that he will
be paid. This is done through the "documentary letter of credit.
"(as distinguished from the "clean letter of credit"), by substituting
the acceptable credit standing of a bank for the unknown or doubtful
credit of the buyer who is the bank's customer.
This device has been used primarily in connection with foreign
imports. It is efficient and inexpensive and should be made available
to buyers in Colorado of goods from foreign countries. But its advantages may also be extended to domestic commerce.
Article 5 does not involve any fundamental changes in the
prior rules and standards which were adopted as the Uniform Customs
and Practices for Commercial Documentary Credits by the International
Chamber of Commerce. While recognized generally by banks in this
country, the Uniform Customs and Practices were never adopted by
treaty, or by federal or state statutes. The inclusion of the article
in the uniform commercial code will give state statutory recognition to
this financial device.
ARTICLE 6 - BULK TRANSFERS
The UCC covers any transfer in bulk, not in the ordinary course,
of a major part of an enterprise whose principal business is the sale
of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture what they
sell, with eight enumerated exceptions. Present Colorado law which was
enacted in 1961 covers the transfer in bulk, not in the ordinary course,
of any part, or the whole, stock in trade of any wholesale or retail
merchandising business, with more limited exceptions.
The provisions with respect to the listing of creditors and
the description of the property to be transferred are substantially the
same. Present Colorado law requires that a notice of the transfer be
posted at least ten days before the transfer at the place of business
where the stock in trade is located, and publication of the notice of
transfer at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county at least five days prior to the transfer. Article 6 does not
require any posting of the notice at the place of business, or
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publication in any newspaper, but requires the transferee to preserve
the list of creditors and the schedule of property in a designated
place in the state of Colorado for six months, or to file the list
and schedule in the office of the Secretary of State. Present Colorado
law requires the transferee to send a copy of the notice of transfer to
every creditor by certified or registered mail at least ten days before
the transfer. The UCC requires the transferee at least ten days before
he takes possession of the goods, or pays for them, whichever happens
first, to give notice .to all creditors, stating that the bulk transfer
is about to be made, the names and business addresses of the transferor
and transferee, and whether or not all of the debts of the tiansferor
are to be paid in full as they fall due as a result of the transaction,
and, if so, the address to which the creditors should send their bills,
but if the debts are not to be so paid, or if the transferee is in
doubt on that point, then the notice must include the location and
general description of the property and the estimated total of the
transferor's debts, whether the transfer. is to pay existing debts, and,
if so, the amount and to whom, or whether the transfer is for new consideration, and, if so, the amount, and time and place of payment.
Present Colorado law has no provision imposing any obligations
upon auctioneers to give notice to creditors, but the UCC requires
auctioneers to give notice at least ten days, either personally or by
registered or certified mail. Failure of the autioneer to do so does
not affect the validity of the sale, but if the autioneer knows that
the auction constitutes a bulk transfer, the auctioneer is liable to
the creditors of the transferor up to but not exceeding the net proceeds of the auction.
Under present Colorado law, persons the transferor has reason
to believe may become creditors prior to the date of transfer are entitled to notice, but under the UCC creditors who become such after the
notice to creditors has been given are not entitled to notice.
Under present Colorado law, the transfer can be adjourned to a
time not more than 30 days subsequent to the original date, and the
transferor can be found guilty of perjury if he makes a false affidavit.
The UCC has no provision for adjournment of the transfer and imposes
no criminal penalties.
Civil liability for noncompliance under the two laws is substantially the same, the Colorado law specifying that the transferee shall
become a receiver and be held accountable to creditors for the stock in
trade that came into his possession, and the UCC specifying that in the
event of noncompliance the bulk transfer is ineffective as against
creditors of the transferor.
Under Colorado law, the remedy under the UCC would be by levy
on the assets in the hands of the transferee, or perhaps by an action
to set aside a fraudulent transfer, or equitable relief by way of
injunction or receivership. A defective bulk transfer constitutes an
act of bankruptcy, and creditors could unite to invoke the avoiding
powers of the trustee under Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act.
After a bulk transfer has been consummated in accordance with
the provisions of the UCC, creditor~ of the transferor have no rights
against the assets of the transferee. Creditors are required to protect
themselves before the transfer is consummated.
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Present Colorado law provides a three-year statute of llmitations, while under the UCC a six-month statute of limitations is
provided.
ARTICLE 7 - DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
Article 7 of the uniform commercial code covers warehouse
receipts, bills of lading, and other documents of title. If enacted
into law in Colorado, this article would govern intrastate transactions. The interstate transportation of goods will continue to be
governed by the Federal Bills of Lading Act. In the process of
developing Article 7, its provisions have in most instances been
brought into line with the Federal Bills of Lading Act.
Colorado adopted the Uniform Warehouse Rec~ipts Act in 1911,
and in 1941 adopted the Uniform Sales Act which, in Sections 27-40,
deals with the negotiable and non-negotiable documents of title.
Colorado never adopted the Uniform Bills of Lading Act. It was, however, enacted in 31 other states.
The report of the commission which studied the uniform comcercial code in Maryland described Article 7, in part, as follows:
Article 7 makes no major policy changes but it
does make a number of minor changes. In addition,
it reorganizes and consolidates the statutory law
relating to Documents of Title, expands its coverage
beyond those of the older Acts, and clarifies and
makes certain some ambiguous provisions in the older
laws. **·*
One policy change provides that a warehouseman is one engaged in storing goods for hire
(7-101) and not one who is 11 lawfully 11 engaged in
the business of storing, as is specified in present
law. There is no reason why the unlawfulness of a
warehousing enterprise should protect the warehouseman from the obligations of the documents he issues.
Under present law, the holder of a negotiable
receipt covering part of a mass of fungible goods,
in the event of a sale of such goods by the warehouseman, can recover the goods if he can trace
them. However~ the difficulty of tracing makes the
rights of such receipt holder of little practical
value. Section 7-205 clarifies the law by providing
that a buyer in the ordinary course of business who
takes delivery of fungible goods from a warehouseman
who is in the business of buying and selling such
goods takes free of any claim under the warehouse
receipt. This resolves in favor of the good-faith
buyer the ~onflict with the receipt holder who also
acted in good faith but who made the sale possible by
depositing with one in the business of selling.
This provision is consonant with Section 2-403 on the
power of one entrusted with goods who is in the
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business of dealing in such goods of transferring
title to a good-faith purchaser in the ordinary
course of business. ***.
Provision is made for termination of storage at
the warehouseman's option at the end of a stated
period and if none is specified on thirty days notice.
If the goods are not removed, the warehouseman may
sell them (7-206}. Present law does not contain a
comparable provision. ***
Article 7 clarifies a number of uncertain provisions in our present law. The present uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform·Bills of Lading Act both prohibit inclusion in a document of a
provision impairing the obligation of the bailee to
exercise due care. There is presently a conflict as
to whether this injunction is violated by a stipulation as to the value of the goods, particularly where
the value is obviously understated. Within certain
limits, the Code approves such stipulations in
Sections 7-204 and 7-309, the justification being
that a fully insured bailer should not be required
to pay charges on full value. This permitted limitation of liability does not apply to an appropriation
of the goods to the bailee's own use. The Code
provision is in accord with the Carmack Amendment to
the Interstate Commerce Act applicable to bills of
lading in inter-state shipments. ~*
The issuer is liable for damages caused by
over-issue or failure to identify conspicuously any
duplicate document (7-402}. Present comparable law
only applies in case of a negotiable document.
Section 7-403 integrates into one Section what
the old Acts covered with unnecessary and somewhat
confusing duplication of effort in three Sections:
one covering the obligation of the bailee to deliver,
another covering justification for delivery, and
still a third, liability for non-delivery.***
It is recommended that Article 7 be enacted in Colorado with
the optional clauses of Section 7-204 and 7-403(l}(b) omitted; that
Article 16 of Chapter 7, CRS 1953, relating to grain warehouses be
repealed; and that Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of Chapter 146, CRS 1953, as
well as Sections 27-40 inclusive, of the Uniform Sales Act be repealed.
However, Article 4 of Chapter 146, which contains the criminal sanctions relating to compliance with various provisions of the warehouse
receipt laws, should be retained in appropriate changes in references
to sections of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which are set forth
therein. The committee finds no need for the repeal of Article 13 of
Chapter 115 relating to unclaimed freight.
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ARTICLE 8 - INVESTMENT SECURITIES
An eminent authority desvribes Article 8 of the UCC in these
words:
'de are talking about conventional types of
securities, stocks and bonds and debentures, the
things we handle in ordinary, everyday corporate
and banking practice. We are not talking about the
more esoteric orange grove contracts in Florida or
silver foxes on the hoof in California that are
securities for regulatory purposes.

What Article 8 does first is to make securities, as defined, negotiable instruments in the
historical legal sense, so that the bona fide purchaser of a security is invulnerable both to
issuer's defenses and to adverse claims of ownership or interest, legal or equitable by or through
prior holders.
As I see it, the major contributions Article 8
has made in the whole area of the negotiability of
securities are these:
First, Article 8 distinguishes clearly between
questions of the genuineness and effectiveness of
the indorsement (power to indorse), and those involving rightfulness of disposition (power to
deliver if you will), of the indorsed instrument.
Second, it substantially cuts down the cases in
which a purchaser of a security, even one known to
be in fiduciary ownership, is required to investigate -- at the risk of his bona fide purchaser
status; and
Third, it clearly limits the cases in which an
issuer is required to investigate before registering
a transfer to two specific situations:
1.

Where an adverse claimant has filed a proper
11
stop transfer" notice; or

2.

Where the issuer itself has demanded and received "excess documentation" -- let us call it
that for lack of a better term.
--Carlos L. Israels, How to Handle
Transfers of Stock. Bonds and Other Investment Securities, 19 Bus. Law 91
(1963).

Relatively little law, either statutory or by court decision,
exists which applies to the billions of dollars per year of transactions to which Article 8 would apply. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act,
CRS 31-9-1 et. seq., adopted in Colorado in 1927, would be superceded
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by Article 8 and covers onlw a few of the matters which Article 8
would cover.

To a large extent, existing law and commercial practice have
been followed in the drafting of this article. However, a conscious
attempt has been made to cha:lllige the law of those cases holding an
issuer or purchaser liable fo-r the wrongful disposition of the proceeds
of a sale of stock, for example, stock sold by a trustee and applied
to his personal benefit.
This problem has beem met, in the case of fiduciaries, by the
adoption of the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary
Security Transfers, CRS 57-6-1 et. seq., adopted in Colorado in 1959.
Article 8 applies the principles of the simplification act to all
transfers, and in fact penalizes the issuer for requiring excessive
documentation.
The 1962 version of the UCC takes in account the changes made
by New York at the insistence of the stock exchanges, banks, and
transfer agents located there. Very few changes have been made in
other states.
No instance has been found where existing Colorado law would
be changed, other than in repeal of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and
changes in two principles contained therein:
1.

CRS 31-9-1 makes delivery and indorsement
necessary to effect a change of ownership
of stock. UCC Section 8-307 makes only
(voluntary) delivery of the security necessary to effect change of ownership with the
transferor being compelled to supply any
necessary indorsements.

2.

CRS 31-9-16 permits a court to order issuance of a replacement certificate. UCC
Section 8-405 makes issuance o.f a replacement certificate mandatory when the requirements of the section are met, without
court order.

It is recommended:
1.

That Article 8 be adopted unchanged.

2.

That Article 1, Chapter 39, CRS 1953
be repealed.

3.

That Article 6, Chapter 57, CRS 1953
be retained by specific reference
10-104(2) of the UCC.
ARTICLE 9 - SECURED TRANSACTIONS

Very little of the substance of existing Colorado security law
would be changed by the adoption of Article 9. One does not arrive at
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this conclusion quickly or easily, however, from the casual reading of
the text of the uniform commercial code. Indeed, the conclusion can
only be reached in about four steps (or jolts) and not without some
mental turmoil.
The first step is the recognition that the code provides in
one article an entire system that is to govern all security transactions, abolishing old language of pledge, of chattel mortgage, of
trust receipts, of conditional sales, and even of such hybrid devices
for security as the sale and lease-back or the consignment of goods.
The scope of the article is readily found in the definition of
security interests in Section 1-201(37) and in the policy statement
of Section 9-102.
So broad and inclusive an application of one code system requires new language that is both precise and distinct from the connotations of the mortgage, pledge and trust receipt. The second step
comes with the realization of the importance of code definitions. At
least thirty-two are contained or adopted in Article 9 and another
forty-four set out in Article 1 as applicable. The impact of so many
definitions upon the student or the practicing lawyer is heavy. The
definitions in Article 1 and in Part I of Article 9 can only be
assimilated after study and familiarity, and here lies a basic problem
in understanding the intricate relationship of the fifty-three sections
of the Article. Each of the seventy-six definitions is carefully
stated, is used without confusion, and of course cannot be changed
without loss of value in the article as a system of codified law.·
Next, after recognizing the importance of the precise definitions of the article, the student realizes that the article uses the
definitions to distinguish carefully the business or economic function
of 9ifferent types of security in different relationships. Thus, the
sale of personal property is excluded from coverage in Article 9 but
the sale of intangible rights is so closely allied to their transfer
as security that the article does cover sales of accounts or contract
rights or chattel paper. Again, the protection of,purchase money
security interests in household furniture is quite a different problem
from the protection of purchase money security interests in fixtures
and the necessity for filing a security agreement in the latter case
is clear, but in the former case is largely unnecessary as shown by
the fact that many chattel mortgages on household goods are today not
filed by the most sophisticated lenders. It is the discovery of a
multitude of rules affecting different classes of property, all within
Article 9, that has the most frightening impact upon the new student.
The fourth and final step lies in the discovery that the
myriad situations that are thus carefully defined and treated give a
result which is either the same or entirely compatible with Colorado
statutes or decisions. The reason that Article 9 makes little change
in the substance of law is not true in many states; it is true in
Colorado for two reasons. In the first place, Article 9 is not intended
to make a change in public policy. Thus, the retail installment sales
acts, usury laws, and small loan laws are not affected and many vary
from state to state. The second reason why the changes in Colorado·
law are minimal is because we have been favored by enlightened, flexible, and workable security laws which are in large part themselves
incorporated into the fundamental principles of the uniform commercial
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code. Colorado is already familiar with the concept of the floating
lien on inventory~ the use of intangibles as security under the Act
for Assignment of Accounts Receivable; and even in the early days,
Colorado adopted a definition of a "chattel mortgage" to embrace a
variety of devices intended to operate to give security. Not all
states have been so fortunate.
It should not be concluded that because Colorado is favorably
positioned with respect to its existing security laws, that Article 9
is unnecessary. Rather, we are fortunate that the adoption of Article
9 can be so easily affected without fundamental changes in our substantive law. The advantages of adopting Article 9 in place of the
present conglomeration of statutes include the following:
1. The adoption of a single system makes possible the assembling of a variety of security laws in the one article with a reasonable assurance of consistent application. Moreover, the code goes
beyond our present law to provide a framework for the economic use
for security purposes of intangible interests which are only now coming to be recognized as important property interests in our economic
system.

2. Secondly, the code does away firmly, once and for all, with
confusion resulting from doctrines concerning title as applied to
security transactions. The question of title may be retained in property transactions, taxation, or elsewhere as a valid concept, but in
security law the rights of the debtor or secured party are to be
determined without ancient or technical concepts of title to cloud the
results.
3. In the third place, Colorado will benefit from a code which
is fundamentally the same both here and in neighboring states. Already twenty-nine states have adopted the code and undoubtedly within
the next few years the code will be as pervasive a feature of law as
the first negotiable instrument law. Colorado has not needed to be in
the vanguard with respect to the uniform commercial code, but neither
should we close our eyes to the advantage of uniformity in commercial
and security transactions between ourselves and other states if we
aspire to a position of importance in commerce and banking as a distribution center. Kansas alone of our near neighbors remains aloof from
the code.
4. A fourth advantage to Article 9 lies in the fact that
definite answers are given in areas which have not in all cases been
the subject of court decision or specific statute. The negotiable
instruments law was a blessing in providing a codification of commercial law in an area in which uniformity was important. Article 9 is a
more complete system than our 1)rior statutes and decisions, and lawyers
will have less difficulty in finding specific answers within its
corners than was true previously.

5. Finally, a distinct advantage lies in the simple and
clear-cut provisions for foreclosure. Again, the practice is not
greatly different from that which we have commonly known. In Mr.
Hellerstein's book on chattel mortgages, he has heretofore cautioned
of the advisability that foreclosures be handled through court proceedings where substantial amounts are involved, and probably many
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many attorneys have shared concern in the handling of foreclosure
sales without benefit of statute and with little certainty as to the
sufficiency of publication or th~ presumption of finality to be attached to the sale's price. This uncertainty is gone and at the same
time rules in Article 9 provide for the protection of all possible
interests while permitting self-help procedures.
To illustrate or explain item-by-item the advantages of Article
9 would duplicate at length the article itself. The advantages of its
adoption are compelling. The only reluctance is the necessity of
learning new definitions and of mastering a new statutory framework.
Time will resolve this problem and the advantages of the code will
favor the state's economy, doubtless for generations to come.
ARTICLE 10 - EFFECTIVE DATE AND REPEALER
The tenth and final article of the code contains sections fixing the effective date, the repeal of specific statutes such as those
listed on page ·11 above, a general repealer section, and a specific
mention of some laws which are not intended to be repealed, such as
the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers.
States which have already adopted the uniform commercial code
have fixed effective dates which generally were from one to two years
after the time of adoption. If the Colorado General Assembly adopts
the code in 1965, the effective date should be sufficiently in the
future to permit the entire commercial and legal community to learn its
provisions, modify their business and legal forms, and be prepared for
the changes which will occur.
Since the uniform commercial code will be a civil law, the
criminal penalties relating to compliance with various provisions of
the warehouse receipts laws, chattel mortgage laws, and other laws
will be presented in a companion bill.
Provisions relating to fees to be charged for filing various
instruments as required under the provisions of the code will likewise
be presented in a companion bill.
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APPENDIX C
REASONS FOR THE CODE
(Adapted by Colorado Bar Association Committee on
Uniform Commercial Code from Similar Report
Prepared for State of Illinois)
There are three basic reasons why the uniform commercial code
should be enacted in Colorado.
The first is that in some areas of commercial law Colorado
is virtually "lawless.'' The rules governing these increasingly important areas are neither settled nor known. In addition, many other
areas of commercial law have no decisional or statutory base. No
commercially important state can afford so much uncertainty as to
applicable law.
The second basic reason is that the original uniform acts which
govern much of Colorado commercial law were promulgated prior to 1910
and reflect the technology and commercial practices of the nineteenth
century. Some of the original uniform acts are inconsistent in policy
with others. The code modernizes and simplifies the law, particularly
with respect to secured transactions, in the light of current commercial need and makes consistent the policies underlying commercial
law.
Finally, today there is no uniformity among the states excPot
among the 30 jurisdictions that have already adopted the code. The
only hope of national uniformity lies in the code. With an ever narrowing world and an ever increasing interstate and international
business, national uniformity of commercial law is essential. The
code, moreover, contains many rules of conflict of laws which simplify
and make certain for enacting jurisdictions the rules of law which are
to be applied in particular interstate and international transactions.
The elimination of uncertainty as to commercial law, its modernization and simplification and the making of commercial law uniform
throughout the nation necessarily expedites and lowers the legal cost
of doing business. The code does all of these and should, therefore,
be enacted in Colorado
The code represents the first concerted and avowed effort to
make the commercial law uniform not only among the several states but
internally as well. Solutions of comparable problems in the separate
articles were brought together for comparison; they had to conform
unless differences could be justified functionally.
The older uniform acts in the commercial field have made great
contributions. However, four of those acts are more than fifty to
sixty years of age. Certainly the time for their re-examination has
come and the code is the result of that re-examination. Perhaps no one
who has worked upon it is completely happy with every provision. In
many parts it is necessarily a compr~mise.
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For these reasons and others more fully set forth in our analysis of the separate articles the code provides a system of commercial
law better suited to our times and much superior to that provided by
existing multifarious statutes and uncertain common law. We believe
we should claim these advantages for today instead of seeking forever
a theoretical perfection unlikely to be achieved.
Scope of the Code
The code covers practically all of the commercial law: sales
of personal property, commercial paper (notes, checks, drafts), bank
collections and the relationship of bank with customer, letters of
credit, bulk sales, documents of title (bills of lading, warehouse
receipts, air bills and the like), investment securities (share
certificates, debentures, bearer and registered bonds and other investment paper), the entire field of security in personal property
(now known as pledges, chattel mortgages, conditional sale contracts,
trust receipts, factor's lien, assignment of accounts receivable). In
large degree the code preserves and continues the law as it is today,
both common law and statutory, but it also makes changes in substance
in each of the many areas it covers. It clarifies the law where it is
now uncertain, and it provides answers with respect to matters of commercial law not now readily found. Each of the nine articles except
Article 5, Letters of Credit, replaces one or more Colorado statutes,
including some of the uniform acts in the commercial field.
How the ~ode Affects Particular Groups of
Jndividuals and Business
The uniform commercial code is not, of course, "all things to
all men.'' Nevertheless, its advantages reach all people with legitimate interests who have contacts with the commercial law. It not only
seeks uniformity among the several states by widespread adoption, but
it achieves a uniformity within the state among all branches of the
commercial law, a uniformity not consciously sought in the past nor
completely achieved. The code simplifies and clarifies the law and
provides a host of answers which cannot be found with certainty today.
It is not revolutionary but on the other hand it modernizes the
law in the light of the experience of over half a century of unprecedented commercial growth since several of our major acts were promulgated.
The code was not prepared by or for any group or class. In
fact, it is probable that never before in the history of legislation
have so many able people worked so long in so earnest an effort to seek
out every legitimate interest and need, to reconcile every conflict of
view and to draft an act which will meet these needs satisfactorily and
at the same time have a fair prospect of widespread adoption.
Neither is the code a collection of "special privileges."
However, in addition to the general advantages of clarity and certainty
which accrue to all, there are some provisions of particular interest
to certain groups and these we shall endeavor to illustrate, but not
to exhaust. These are: The Consumer; The Man with a Bank Account;
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The Manufacturer; The Distributor; The Retailer; The Farmer; The
Insurance Company; The Security Dealer, Investment Broker and Issuing
Corporation; and The Credit Manager.
The Consumer
Almost all persons, natural or artificial, are consumers.
The group includes the bank president, the very apotheosis of business
acumen, and the unskilled worker who is generally not well versed in
business matters. Almost all consumers have contact with the commercial law with respect to sales. Many will continue under the code,
as they do today, almost unaware of the law of sales. However, if they
seek guidance in advance of action they will find in the tode a scheme
of things worked out more completely and presented with greater clarity
than in the law today. They are more likely to find a solution to
their problem arrived at with due respect for fair play for all parties
then under present law.
The code frowns upon the unconscionable contract. There is, of
course, nothing necessarily unconscionable about selling an article
without warranty of any kind but there is if the buyer is not made
aware of the fact that the transaction is upon that basis. The code requires that any disclaimer of warranty be made much clearer than does
the present law.
The code makes it clear that the warranty runs both to members
of the family and to the guest aAd as proposed in Colorado to any
person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be effected by
the goods. If the dinner guest is the one who bites on the concealed
tack in the bread or the ground glass in the jar of baked beans it
should be a comfort to both host and guest that the latter has the
benefit of the immediate seller's warranty and is not remitted to uncertain recourse against the manufacturer in a difficult negligence
action.
If a buyer makes known his needs and relies upon the seller's
skill and judgment to supply an article to meet them, there is an
implied warranty that the article is suitable for the purpose. Unfortunately, under present law there is a provision which seems to invite
the seller's defense that there is no warranty if the purchaser requests
an article bearing a "patent or trade name." The code omits this unfortunate suggestion.
The consumer will profit by the simplification of the process
by which he can give security in the personal property he buys and by
the clear spelling out of his rights and duties on default. Under
present law, because of conflicting and unnecessary complications in
the formalities required to make the security good against third parties,
the secured party too often loses his security by an inadvertent slip
which it is humanly impossible always to avoid. The buyer's levying
creditor may gain a windfall, or a purchaser to whom the buyer wrongfully
has resold may take free of the security interest although the means to
discover it were at hand, but the debtor himself does not profit by the
secured party's loss for he remains liable in any case. Moreover,
debtors as a class must pay the increased cost of such financing. The
code not only reduces the formalities to a minimum but it provides that
-

31 -

even in case of a slip the creditor and purchaser with actual knowledge of the security interest cannot take advantage of the slip, as
under some circumstances they can under the law of Colorado today.
The Man with the Bank Account
All who use checks, either by issuing them or rece1v1ng them,
will profit by the greater certainty under the code of the rules under
which the check moves from bank to bank in the collection process.
The right of the drawer of a check to stop payment is recognized under present law but in some states the banks have exacted
from their customers a promise not to hold the bank liable if it overlooks the stop order. The code makes such an agreement invalid as a
matter of public policy whether supported, by consideration or not.
At the same time, in fairness to the bank which overlooks the stop
order, it subrogates the bank to the rights of the person it has paid;
this will often avoid an unjust enrichment of the drawer at the bank's
expense.
The Manufacturer
The manufacturer gains substantially from the improved law of
sales, both with respect to his purchases of raw materials and wi~h
respect to his sales of finished products. Our present sales act, now
half a century old, was framed more in terms of the single sale. In
contrast, the _code visualizes a continuous flow of goods in commerce.
If a manufacturer learns before the date for delivery that his
supplier, in breach of contract, will not deliver at the appointed
time, he may contract with others for his supply. This he may do under
present law and under the code. However, there is a difference: under
present law the damages he will recover for the breach will be determined by the market price at the time set for delivery whereas, under·
the code, it is the cost of "cover" at the time he contracted for it
which is to govern. Under present law his purchase of "cover" is
somewhat a gamble. Under the code the wisdom of his action is weighed
as of the time he acted.
The code provides a simple system for giving security in inventory with formalities reduced to a minimum. It allows the manufacturer to give a general security interest in his shifting stock of
inventory presently owned or after-acquired. On the other hand, it
does not prevent someone else from obtaining a first lien on goods he
has financed, though the party with the general lien is entitled to
notice of the purchase money security interest. As a matter of fact,
a particular advantage of the code for all. concerned inheres in its
specific provisions dealing with .the relat'ive priority of liens of
variou~ kinds and with the extent of validity of liens obtained in
other states on property subsequently brought into a code state.
The manufacturer benefits also because, if need be, he can
obtain reliable security in his product in the event he finances purchases by his wholesale and retail distributors.
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The Distributor
Like the manufacturer, the distributor benefits from the modernization of the law both as one who gives and as one who takes
security. Both distributor and manufacturer, if they market their
products and wares in more than one state, will gain from the uniformity which will result from wide adoption of the code. Today, there is
less uniformity with respect to security than in any other field of
the law. Consider for example a company which manufacturers farm implements and distributes them in every state. It has found that
compliance with the varying requirements of the 50 states with respect
to chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's
liens and other security devices poses a riddle which is almost insoluble. As a result, companies in that position are most enthusiastic
supporters of the code.
The Retailer
The retailer, like all who buy or sell goods, will gain from
the improved law of sales. Of the 111 sections in Article 2, Sales,
37 have no prior statutory counterpart. The code, therefore, answers,
roughly, 50 percent more questions than our present sales act and it
does so in the light of over a half century of experience under the
older act.
Like the manufacturer and the distributor, the retailer profits
from a system, effective and simple, by which in a single device he
may give security in inventory and equipment, presently owned and afteracquired. If goods he has sold are returned to him, the security interest can reattach without question.
·
The security interest may cover the proceeds of his sales,
whether simple book accounts for unsecured sales or a reserved security
interest in what he has sold. If he then sells the reserved security
interest and the debt it secures (called by the code "chattel paper"}
the code provides a clear system of priorities between the secured
party with an interest in "proceeds" and the purchaser of the 11 chattel
paper." Many of these questions cannot be solved with assurance under
present law.
The Farmer
The farmer, also, is continuously engaged in commerce, as a
buyer and seller of goods and a borrower of money. Thus he, too, has
an interest in the clarification and improvement of the law of sales,
bank deposits and collections and security devices. Moreover, he will
benefit particularly from provisions of the code which liberalize and
simplify security interests in farm equipment, feed, livestock and
crops and these security documents continue to be filed locally at his
own county seat, convenient to him. Like other borrowers who give
security to obtain a loan, he will find increased protection under the
code.
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The Insurance Company
The code does not deal with insurance companies as such and
they benefit only as others do who come into contact with the commercial law. Insurance companies hold vast quantities of investment
securities and the stock companies are issuers of stock certificates.
In both capacities they benefit from a modernized system of handling
transfers of security paper, as indicated briefly in the next section.
Insurance companies issue and receive checks and drafts in enormous
quantities and will derive benefit from an improved and better regulated bank collection system.
Security Dealer, Investment Broker
and Issuing Corporation
Article 8 provides a modernized and improved system of handling
all transfers of investment securities. The bearer bond has not been
confortable within the confines of the negotiable instruments law.
The stock transfer act governs transfers of stock certificates only.
The registered bond and other registered securities have been left
pretty much without statutory guidance. Because all of these are
similar with respect to transfer problems they are gathered together
in Article 8. For the first time there is a comprehensive treatment
of the whole transfer problem. All who handle investment paper should
benefit materially from increased certainty and simplicity.
The Credit Manager
In addition to many of the things already mentioned under
other headings, there are other improvements in the code which will be
recognized by credit managers of business concerns. For instance,
pitfalls in the inception of a sales transaction are removed by simplification of the requirement of a memorandum satisfying the statute of
frauds, recognition of an offer binding for a reasonable period without
special consideration, provisions regarding the effect of confirmations
between merchants, provisions authorizing and describing the effect of
open price terms, and other innovations in the law tailored to reasonable business practices and expectations. A seller is given limited
protection in the event of insolvency of the buyer shortly after
delivery of the goods and before they have been paid for, and a buyer
is given similar protection in the event of insolvency of a seller
occurring shortly after receipt of advances but before delivery of the
goods.
General creditors will benefit from the requirement of a more
adequate notice in advance of bulk sales; and the concealed ownership
of goods held on consignment for sale, as well as the secret lien of
an assignee of accounts receivable, will be outlawed by the requirement
of public filing. On the other hand, the notice type of filing authorized by the code will be far simpler and less expensive than is the
recordation of chattel mortgages today. Realization on security in the
event of default will be standardized and simplified and better suited
to the protection of the interests of.all parties.
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APPENDIX D
The Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section of the
Colorado Bar Association is governed by a council, the officers and
members of which are:
Harl G. Douglass
Julius Friedrich
David J. Clarke
Charles E. Grover

Boulder
Denver
Denver
Denver

Robert W. Bartley
Louis A. Hellerstein
Robert F. Welborn
Thomas J. Harshman

Pueblo
Denver
Denver
Grand Junction

Chairman
Vice Chairman
Secretary
Immediate Past
Chairman
Member
Member
Member
Member

The Corporation Section, during the fall of 1963, created a
Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code. Approximately 60 members
of the section were appointed to that committee.
The Uniform Commercial Code Committee has had an executive
committee and three subcommittees. The officers and members of the
executive committee and the chairmen of the subcommittees who worked
on each of the several articles of the Code are:
David J. Clarke, Chairman
Charles A. Baer, Vice Chairman
Thomas J. Kerwin, Secretary
H. Harold Calkins, Subcommittee Chairman on
Articles 2, 6 and 7
Charles H. Haines, Jr., Subcommittee Chairman
on Article 9
Lester R. Woodward, Subcommittee Chairman
on Articles 3, 4, 5 and 8
Bruce Buell, Chairman of the Section's
Committee on Banking
Louis A. Hellerstein, Chairman of the Section's
Committee on Secured Transactions
Alec J. Keller, Chairman of the Section's Committee
on Securities
The members of the subcommittees who made the initial analyses
of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (and without whose
efforts the task would never have been accomplished) were:*
ARTICLE 2 - SALES
H. Harold Calkins, Chairman
Gail E. Oppenner
George B. Brennan
John C. Corbridge
Clayton Knowles

Robert S. Gast, Jr.
Gilbert L. Mcswain
Hugh J. McClearn
Edward A. \falsh
James C. Seccombe, Jr.
* Articles 1 and 10 were handled

by

the Executive Committee
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ARTICLE 3 - COMMERCIAL PAPER
Lester R. Woodward, Chairman
William P. Waggener
Ben D. Sublett
Robert Yegge

Don Sears
Ira E. Tanner
John W. Low

ARTICLES 4 and 5 - BANK DEPOSITS AND
COLLECTIONS and LETTERS OF CREDIT
Lester R. Woodward, Chairman
George Gibson
J. Peter Lindsay
Fred Pattridge

Don Sears
James C. Owen, Jr.
John S. Potter
William R. Kelley

ARTICLES 6 and 7 - BULK TRANSFERS and
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING, etc.
H. Harold Calkins, Chairman
Elmer P. Cogburn
Bradford Wells

Jack B. Toll

ARTICLE 8 - INVE.:5TMENT SECURITIES
Lester R. Woodward, Chairman
Ernest Lohf

Charles E. Henry
Sanford Hertz

ARTICLE 9 - SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Charles H. Haines, Jr., Chairman
Stephen A. Hellerstein, Secretary
R. Dale Tooley, Chairman, Part 2
Robert D. Charlton, Chairman, Part 3
Willis Carpenter, Chairman, Part 4
Douglas R. State, Chairman, Part 5
Edward M. Sears
Arthur J. Seifert
Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr.
J. Albert Sebald
Robert G. Wilson
Keith Anderson
James Robb
Paul DeF. Hicks, Jr.

Michael Vaggalis
Robert J. Shanstrom
D. Monte Paseo
Richard Wohlgenant
Stanton D. Rosenbaum
Robert F. Thompson
John D. Knodel!, Jr.
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APPENDIX E
VlHY THE COMMERCIAL CODE SHOULD BE "UNIFORM"

By William A. Schnader
(Reprinted by Permission of the Author and
the Washington and Lee Law Review)
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WHY THE COMMERCIAL CODE
SHOULD BE UNIFORM''
0

WILLIAM

Subsection
statealhat:

(2)

of section

A.

1-101

5cHNADER•

of the Uniform Commercial Code

· · .. (2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
"(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
"(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of th~ parties;
.. (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."

Business men, lawyers, legislators and legislative draftsmen have
no difficulty in understanding the purposes and policies of the Code as
stated in clauses (a) and (b).
Everybody can understand why the law governing commercial
transactions should be simplified, clarified and modernized, and why
there should be continued expansion of commercial practices in this
country through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.
Therefore, one would think that if the hundreds of thousands of
hours of time and the hundreds of thousands of dollars of money
which went into the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code had
produced a "model" Commercial Code, to serve as the base for any
state desiring to improve its statutory law governing commercial transactions, the states would have enacted it immediately.
The truth is that the busy judges, law professors and practicing
lawyers who contributed the hundreds of thousands of hours, and the
foundations and business concerns that contributed the hundreds of.
thousands of dollars, would never have contributed their time or their
money for the preparation of a "model" Commercial Code.
Viewed from this standpoint, the most important of the underlying
purposes and policies of the "Uniform" Commercial Code is the last,
namely, "to make uniform the law among th~ various jurisdictions."
•Partner, Schnader, Harrison, Segal &: Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.; Chairman, Per•
manent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, American Law Institute,
Philadelphia, Pa. A.B. 1go8, U.D. 1931, Franklin and Manhall College; LLB. 191a,
. aoh. lJpiverllity of Pelllll}'lftllia; J..l.,I>, 19511~ Temple Uniftllitv.
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Here, too; we get general agreement among businessmen and lawyen that theoretically the law governing a>mmercial transactions

should be uniform among every American jurisdiction.
In this country there are only two possible methods of obtaining
complete uniformity of the statutory law on any subject. One .method
is the enactment of a law by Congress. The other method is by adoption of the same statute by fifty states and the District of Columbia.
The difficulty with the first method, when we are considering the
regulation of commercial transactions, is that Congress does not have
complete power to deal with such transactions. It may deal with them
only if they are in or affect interstate commerce. All of us know that
the United States Supreme Court has found it possible to say that
almost every commercial transaction "affects" interstate coounerce, but
even so there is a segment of these transactions which could not be said
to have the slightest effect upon commerce between the states. Thus,
to give Congress power to enact a statute like the Uniform Commercial Code which would be universally applicable throughout American jurisdictions, a constitutional amendment expanding the power
of Congress to regulate commerce would be necessary.
If our state laws regulating commercial transactions are not made
uniform in substantially all respects within the next few years, it is not
unlikely that a movement may be initiated to have the necessary constitutional amendment proposed and adopted.
More than seventy years ago, in 1892, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was organized because it was
felt that there were certain areas of statutory law which needed to
be uniform throughout the United States, and because it was felt that
legislative power should not be further concentrated in the hands of
the federal Congress. One of the subjects upon which there was general
agreement that there should be uniformity was the law of commercial
transactions. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the very first year of
its existence the Conference promulgated an act on notes, checks,
drafts and bills of exchange, and in 1896 it promulgated the Negotiable Instruments Law, a much more pretentious act dealing with
commercial paper.
Promulgated in 19o6 w~ the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act, in 1909 the Uniform Bills of Lading Act
and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and still later, the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
Of these seven important acts regulating commercial transactions,
only three have been enacted by every American jurisdiction. these bein2 the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Warehouse
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R~.Act and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. However, it requir•-twenty-eight yean to have the N.I.L. enacted by all the states,
Jiftee-.,yeaQ to accomplish the same result with the Uniform Warehou•Receipts Act and forty-seven years to have ·the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act adopted in every jurisdiction.
The-Uniform Sa.les Act was promulgated in 1906, but after almost
sixty .Jan it has not as yet been universally enacted by the states,
eithcr.-parately or in modified form as Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.
On the surface it might seem that to have the law relating to negotiable. instruments uniform throughout the United States after
twenty-eight yean was a notable achievement. That might be so except for two facts. One fact js that non-uniform amendmcnu were
made by this state and that state, without consultation with or die
approval or consent of the other states which had the N J.L. on theit
statute books. The other fact is that in 1940, by actual count. 8o of the
1g8 sections of the N.1.L. had different meanings in different jurisdictions because their highest courts had construed them differently.
There is no kno1"n way in which the Supmne Courts of our American states can be induced. in construing a statutory provision, to follow the decisions of the highest courts of other states construing the same
provision.· Thus, it is incumbent upon the draftsmen of unifDrm acts
to
than ordinary efforts to use clear and unambiguous language. That is the surest way to avoid divergent interpretations of the
same language by different couns. However, in the drafting of the
Uniform Commercial Code another step was taken. to avoid this undesirable result. Careful comments were made explaining the history
and purpose of each section. These comments are "official" because
they were prepared, reviewed and adopted by the same persons who
prepared, reviewed and adopted the text of a,he Code.
It was very laigely because of the existing non-uniformity of the
Negotia:ble lnstn1rnents Law as it had been modified either by legislative ameridments or ..judicial legislation" that in 1940, the proposal
was
that ·a Unifomi Commercial Code be prepared and promulgated in an effwt to make the law regulating commercial transactions really uniform- throughout the states.
Also, there were conflicting provisions in the Uniform Sales Act,
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act. Such a situation was undesirable and required attention.
Thus it was that in the fall of 1940, when the National Conference

exert more

made ·
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of Commissionen on Uniform State Laws met in Philadelphia, the
writer, who was then its President, said: 1
"Our splendid commercial acts were prepared and adopted
by this Conference many years ago. Many changes in methods
of transacting business have taken place in the meanwhile.
"In addition, they were adopted and recommended piecemeal. In a number of respects, there is overlapping and duplication, and in some instances, inconsistency, in dealing with
negotiable instrUments, bills of lading, warehouse receipts, stock
tramfers, sales.and trust receipts.
"'Could not a great uniform commercial code be prepared,
whp. ~ bring the. commercial law up to da.te, and which
~ ~ tht u.aiform law of our fifty-three jurisdictions.
· by
of only 6fty-thrcc acts, ~tead of many times

·'tm'a....

that

.

amwered

Tbe-~~~ . Omference·
the question in the affirmative
but it ~ ~t dae project was· too great for it alone to handle.

F~tely/ it was able to ~ the cooperation of The An:terican
Law lmtitute. _J'11nds were mbacribed and the work was undertaken
a n d ~ as the major project of both organizations during a

· period of q ~ y SC\'ell yan. .
The/Code 1QS &nally proniulgated at a joint meeting of both
~ in-~ YortCity in September, 1951. Its first enactment . -..by .tbir ~ffffla LegislatW~\µI April, 1953, and to date,
3

May 1, •.'6s
. ..• it_~
. .·. . beefi.•
.. efla4ffl b·.y twcnt~.
·.· additional states.
. Wheatbe Umfonn Laws Annotated edition of the Code came out
ill ~ · 1962, Ollly eighteen states had enacted the Code, and thus
it wu impossible in that edition to call a.ttentiQn ~ the wriations in
the text of . ~ which have been made by. the~6vc states which
have thus f a r ~ it this year.
-'
·
To show the lack of undcntanding of legislators and legislative
draftsmen -of the imp>rtance of uniformity in a monumental Code
iaccnded to regula~ all commercial transactiom in the United States,
wej~all calt specific attention to the .v,ariatious made in the eighteen
,'.·"

••

:

11940

<

__

,.

•

llandboo'k. -Of

Slate Laws,

s8 (1940).

•

•

•

'

the Natjonal c.mfereaa: of

-

CommissioQua on Uniform

'The .55 j u ~ Jndude the District of Columbia, Alub, Hawaii, the
Philippmes and.Puerto llko. Granting of independence to tbe Philippines awuced
· the number to 51.
"For a·fuller history of the preparation of the code see the edition of the Code
published by Edward Thompson Company of Brooklyn, New York, as a pan of Uoi•
form Laws Annotcd, at pages LXIII and LXXI. AU ciiatiom of the Code hereafter
will be to that work which, according to the publisher, is to be cited as Uniform
Commercial Code (ULA), but which we shall cite as UCC, ULA.
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states that had enacted the Code prior to January 1, 1963, in Article
son Commercial Paper, which largely tales the place of the N.I.L.
This will demonstrate more vividly than could be demonstrated
in any other way the difficulty of obtaining complete statutory uniformity in the law regulating commercial transactions in this country,
. as long as the states are permitted to deal with this area of the law,
unless a different attitude can be instilled into our legislators and
into our state legislative draftsmen.
Parenthetically, let me state that the question which this article
is intended to answer has not been overlooked. It will be answered
later.
As promulgated by The American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Article s of
the Code contains 79 sections. As indicated in I UCC, ULA, pages
359-568 only 58 of -the 79 sections were uniformly adopted in the
eighteen states. Incidentally, the reader should have in mind the
states about which we are speaking. They are, in the order in which
they enacted the Code, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Wyoming, Arkansas. New
Mexico, Ohio, Orgeon, Oklahoma, Illinois, New Jersey, Georgia,
Alaska, New York and Michigan. Included in these states are, with
several notable exceptions, the most important states in the Union as
far as concerns commerce, finance and industry.
Of the twenty-one sections of this most important Article which
wer~ not uniformly adopted, a number suffered at the hands of what
may be called statutory tinkeren. It must be remembered that the
Editor-in.Chief of the Code was the late Karl N. Llewellyn, who in
addition to being probably the country's foremost authority on commercial law, was one of the most accomplished and expert statutory
draftsmen and critics our country has ever produced. Every line of
the Code as promulgated had Karl's personal approval. Some of Karl's
associates were equally adept and expert in statutory draftsmanship.
For these reasons, to put it mildly, it takes a peculiar type of courage
for an assistant in some legislative drafting agency (or even his chief)
to presume that he has found a reason for changing the language of
the Official Text and thus to destroy the complete uniformity of the
Code. 4

Now, let us look at the changes made by some states in Article 5.
The very first section of Article 5, Section s•101, is entitled ..Short
Title." It reads:
'This Artiole shall be known, and may be cited as Uniform
Commercial C.Ode---Commercial Paper."

1963]

'This criticism has no application to modifications due to local procedural
differences. It does apply to legislative drafting agencies which refuse to depan
from their peculiar local drafting policies. Unifonnity is impossible in a farflung
field of law such as the regulation of commercial transactiona unless every state is
willing to yield !Ollle Points (which ordinarily might be deemed important) in
order to conform to the majority.

Ohio omitted this section entirely, and in Oregon the words "shall
be known and" were omitted. 1 UCC, ULA 561.
·
It must be conceded that these omissions are minor, but they do
indicate that the draftsmen who were responsible for them did not
realize the importance of uniformity. Certainly, the inclusion in the
Uniform Commercial Codes of both states of the section as written
would have been completely harmless. .
.
Nothing can justify the result, namely, that sixteen pre•1963 Code
states include in their Codes this section as drafted by the Code's ex·
perts but that two states made these unnecessary and insignificant

changes.

.

The next section in which unauthorized variations were made 1s
section 5-101, entitled "Definitions and Index of Definitions." Her~
we find that changes were made in· the Codes of Arkansas, Connecucut, Ohio and Oklahoma. 1 UCC, ULA 565.
Subsection (t) of Section 5-101 begins, "Other definitions applying to this Article and the sections in which they appear are," and
then follows a list of definitions, all contained in Article !l·
Subsection (!l) of the same section states that-''The following
definitions in other Articles apply to this Anicle" and then lists a
number of definitions contained in Article 4.
Arkansas and Oklahoma felt is necessary to include in subsection
(t) "Documentary Draft" which is listed in subsection (!l) _as appearing
in section 4-104- This was clearly unnecessary as subsection (5) states
that •the definitions there listed "apply to this anicle."
In Connecticut and Ohio there was a little careless proo&eading.
Several references were to the wrong section.
Now we come to a different type of amendment. but before discussing it, it is necessary to say a word about the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Unifonn Commercial Code.
When the practice of making non-uniform amen~nts. seemed _to
be becoming general in state after state, it was detenruned. 1f financial
support could be obtained, to create a Permanent Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code, and to ask those in chugc of
campaigns to have the Code enacted in non-Code states to witbold
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making unauthorized amendments until the proPosed amendments
could be submitted to and passed uPon by the Board.
The necessary financial support was obtained, an agreement was
made by The American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for the creation and functioning of the Board, and three sub-committees were appointed to
study and examine any proposals made for the amendment of the
Code, and also to examine the unauthorized amendments already
made in Code states and ·to approve or disapprove them.
The assignment of Subcommittee No. 1 is Articles 1, 2, 6 and 7
of the Code; the assignment of Subcommittee No. 2 is Articles g, 4,
5 and 8; and, to Subcommittee No. g is assigned Article 9.
The Pennanent Editorial Board organized in May 1g62, its subcommittees worked assiduously over the summer of 1962, and the Board
had a three-day meeting in Philadelphia in the middle of October,
after which it made its Rep0rt No. 1. In this Report a number of
amendments were approved and promulgated, but a far greater
number were disapproved.
This brings us back to •the consideration of amendments to Article
New York amends subsection (1)(c) of section 3-105 of the Code
by adding certain words which would make a substantive difference
in that subsection. 1 UCC, ULA 373.
_ In its October 1962 Report, the Editorial Board approved this
amendment. Thus, the only criticism of New York's action was that
New York acted individually and without first consulting the Editorial
Board which had drafted the Code.
New York also amended sections g-107(2), 3-112(1 )(b)(c), 3-504,
3·4 15, 3-504(4), 3-701 and 3-804.
Two changes were made in subsection 3-107(2), both of which
were rejected by the Editorial Board in irs Report. The Board gave
its reasons for rejection at length. 1 UCC, ULA, 379, and RePort. page
71.
Section 3-112 is entitled "Terms and Omissions not Affecting
Negotiability." 1 UCC, ULA 389.
The New York changes, in subsections (1)(b) and (c), were not
approved by the Permanent Editorial Board, but the Board recommended that subsection (1)(b) be modified in a different way from
that in which New York. had amended it. Report, page 20.
Section 3-304-"Notice to Purchaser"-was amended by adding an
entirely new clause (7) at the end of the section. 1 UCC, ULA 440.
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The added clause practically reinstated section 56 of the N.I.L.
in the Code, a section which had produced a tremendous amount of
litigation and was intentionally abandoned by the Code's draftsmen.
The Pennanent Editorial Board saw no reason for reversing a
decision which had been deliberately made. RePort, page 74.
New York added to Section 3-415-"Contract of Accommodation
Party"-a new subsection (6). 1 UCC, ULA 497.
The added clause would have restored the warranty obligations of
an accommodation indorser formerly imposed by sections 65 and 66
of ·the N.I.L.
The policy decision set forth in the Official Text of the Code was
carefully considered and the Permanent Editorial Board was not
penuaded that it should reverse the previous decision. Report. page

74Section J-504(4) was amended by inserting at the beginning a
clause which docs not appear in the Official Text The clause refers
to section 4-204- 1 UCC, ULA 516.
The Editorial Board neither approved nor disapproved of this
change.
Section 5-701-"Letter of Advice oflnternational Sight Draft"-was
amended by deleting entirely subsection (3). 1 UCC, ULA 558.
This subsection is:
"(3) Unless otherwise agreed and except where a draft is
drawn under a credit issued by the drawee, the drawee of an
international sight draft owes the drawer no duty to pay an
unadvised draft but if it does so and the draft is genuine, may
appropriately debit the drawer's account."
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this deletion stating that
"insufficient grounds have_ been advanced to delete the subsection."
R.eport, page 76.
Section 3-804-"Lost, Destroyed or Stolen Instruments"-was amended by changing the word "may" to "shall" in the sentence, "The court
may require security indemnifying the defendant against Joss by reason of further claims on the instrument." 1 UCC, ULA 565.
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this change on the
ground that courts should have discretion whether or not to require
security. Report, page 77.
Connecticut in 1961 amended section 3-1o6 of its Code. 1 UCC,
ULA 377. That section is entitled "Sum Cenain." _
Section 3-106 begins, "(1) The sum payable is a sum certain even
though it is to be paid" and then follow five situations which do not
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prevent the sum payable from being a sum certain. To these situations
Connecticut added a sixth clause reading as follows:

"(£) with provisions for payment by the maker of taxes levied
or a~scssecl upon the instmmcnt or the indebtedness evidenced
thereby."
This amendment apparently escaped the attention of the Permanent Editorial Board as its Report neither approves nor disapproves
it.
Oklahoma amended section 5-110, entitled "Payable to Order." by
inserting the word ''there" in subsection (1)(g) so as to make the last
part of the subesction read-"and may be indorsed or transferred by
any person there thereto 1,11thorized." We cannot believe that this was
an intentional amendment. See I UCC. ULA 586.
Arkansas amended sections 5-118(a) and 5-501(2)(b). Section 5-118
is entitled "Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction." Subsection (a) as drafted by the sponsors of the Code reads (1 UCC, ULA
401):
"Where there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft or
a note the holder may treat it as either ...."
The draftsman apparently thought that he would improve this Ian,
~age by adding the word "drawn" after the word "draft"! ·
Section 5-501 is entitled "When Presentment. Notice of Dishonor,
and Protest Necessary or Permissible." 1 UCC, ULA 515.
Arkansas amended subsection (1)(b) so as to make it identical with
subsection (1)(b). This was obviously an error.
For this reason. it was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board.
Report, page 75.
Connecticut. Illinois. Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island
amended section 5-u1 in substantially the same manner, and the Permanent Editorial Board approved the change in its October 1g61
ReporL Report. page u. See 1 UCC, ULA 4og-410.
Wyoming rewrote subsection (5) of section 5-101, entitled "Negotiation" and omitted subsection (4) entirely. 1 UCC, ULA 415.
The rewriting of subsection (5) was disappro'VCd by the Permanent
Editorial Board (Report, page 75) as was the deletion of subsection
(4) which reads:
"(4) Words of assigninent. condition. waiver, guaranty, limitation or disclaimer of liability and the like accompanying an
indorsement do not affect its character as an indorsemenL"
The Permanent Editorial Board pointed out that this subsection
resolved a conflict in decisions under the N .I.L and that for this pur-
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pose it was very useful. Accordingly, it rejected the Wyoming amendmenL Report, page 75.
Arkansas and Oregon made changes in subsection (4) of section
5-1o6 entitled "Effect of Restrictive lndorsement:• 1 UCC. ULA 412.
The Arkansas deviation is merely an inaccuracy, referring to section 5-105 instead of to section 5-501.
The Oregon change would omit a reference to another section in
parentheses. These cross references appear throughout the Code for
the purpose of making clear the intention of particular provisions. No
good reason can be imagined for having deleted this reference.
Rhode Island departs from the Official Text in section s-1<>7 entitled "Negotiation Effective Although It May Be R.escinded." 1 UCC,
ULA 425.
The last sentence of this section is as follows:
.. (1) Exceet as against a subsequent holder in due course
such negotiauon is in an appropriate case subject to rescission.
the declaration of a constructive trust or any other remedy
permitted by law."

Rhode Island deleted the word "other" before "remedy."
This change was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board as
being merely a matter of style, without any legal significance. R.eport.
P•74New Mexico amended section 5-405(1)(b} entitled "Signature by
Authorized R.epresentative." 1 UCC, ULA 465.
The amendment consists of inserting the word "not" in such a
way as to make the last clause of the subsection meaningless.
Georgia amended section 5-405 entitled "lmposton; Signature in
Name of Payee" by substituting the word .. Imposter" for ..Impostor."
1 UCC, ULA 471. Th.is no doubt was accidental but there is a difference in the meaning of the words.
New Mexico and New York amended section 5-411, entitled "/u;ceptance Varying DrafL" I ucc. ULA 491.
Subsection (1) reads:
''The terms of the draft are not varied by an acceetance to
pay at any particular bank or place in the continental United
States, unless the acceptance states that the draft is to be paid
only at such bank or place."
New Mexico substituted the word ..and" for "er' u the next to the
last word. New York omitted the word "continental."
The Editorial Board approved the omission of the word "continental" and ignored the New Mexico variation. Report, page 15.
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Ohio felt it necessary to modify section 3-419 relating to "Conversion of Instrument; Innocent Representative." 1 UCC, ULA 512.
The Official Text refers to "provisions of this act concerning restrictive endorsements." The Ohio draftsman was not satisfied with
this but made specific reference by number to four sections of the
Code.
Both Kentucky and Oklahoma amended subsection (1)(d) of section 3-6o1 by substituting the word "security" for "collateral." 1 UCC,
UI.A 545·
The Permanent Editorial Board rejected this substitution stating
that the word should. be "collateral." Report, page 76.
Oklahoma amended subsection (1)(b) of section 3-801 by inserting
into the subsection an additional sentence. 1 UCC, ULA 562.
The Editorial Board rejected the amendment on the ground that
"the additional language is already well recognized as a matter of case
law." Repart, page 76.
Of the eighteen pre-1963 Code states, five enacted the 79 sections of
Article 3 without any variations from the Official Text. These states
were Alaska, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
Five states amended one section of the Official Text. These states·
were Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts and Wyoming.
Two states, New Mexico and Rhode Island, changed two sections;
two states, Connecticut and Ohio, changed three sections, and three
states, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Oregon, changed four sections.
New York felt it necessary to amend nine sections. However, it
must be said for New York that a bill enacted by the 1g63 legislature
has made the New York Code adhere much more nearly to the 1962
Official Text:i than the New York Act of 1962 conformed to the 1958
Official Text.
Although twenty-five sections of Article 3 were modified, nineteen
of these sections were changed by only one state. The largest number
of states to make the same am.endment was five.•
Fifty-four sections (unamended in any of the eighteen states) constitute a little more than sixty-eight per cent of the sections in Article
3. I,t is true that of the amendments made to the twenty-five modified
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sections, some were trivial, some were careless, and some were the result of a misunderstanding of the history and purpose of the section
as promulgated by the Institute and the Conference.
The amendments which were trivial may be said to have done
no harm but it can be said with equal force that being trivial, they
should not have been made. The amendments which were due to
carelessness illustrate the importance of having an act of the magnitude
of the Code thoroughly proof-read.The amendments made because
of a misunderstanding of the history and purpose of the amended provisions ought not to have been made without consulting the original
Editorial Board which had supervised the drafting of the Code and
which, although not active, was nevertheless available for consultation
at all times.,
It is too early to give in detail the results of 1965 enactments either
of the Code or of amendments to the Code.
We do know that five states which thus far have enacted the Code
this year are said to have adopted the 1961 Official Text And we do
know that in a few, but not nearly the entire eighteen, of the states
which enacted the Code prior to 1sG5, bills have either been enacted
or are pending to bring the Code up to date by incorporating the
officially promulgated 1g61 amendments. As this is being written, legislatures are still in session so that it would be futile to try to assess
the result of this year's legislation.
Now, finally, we come to the question, Why is uniformity important in our statutory law regulating commerciel transactions?
The answer seems so obvious that it is almost difficult to formulate
it.
Today, in the United States, the number of important concerns
which transact business in every state is growing every year and the
number which transact business in only one state is becoming less and
less percentagewise. Writing as long ago as April 1958 in The Busineu
Lawyer, Walter D. Malcolm, Esquire, of Boston, stated that:

rrhe 1g62 Ollidal Text is the 1958 Official Text with the amendments promulgated by the Permanent Editorial Board in October, 1g62.

"[T]he number of 'items' handled by banks as part of the
bank collection process has, since 1goo, grown to tremendous
proportions. It has been estimated that throughout the entire
country banks handle not less than 25,000,000 items every business day. As a matter of fact a rough test, made after that
25,000,000 estimate was made, indicates that the figure is nearer
50,000,000 items per day rather than twenty-five.

'We have not included as a change the amendment of§ 3-511. There was a
typographical error in printing the 1958 Official Tex:t with C.Omments. This error
resulted in the substitution of the word "of" for "or". The ,even states which did
not catch the error until after their Clodes had been enaaed were Arkansas, c.onnecticut, Georgia, lllinols, Mamchmetu, Oregon and Wyoming.

'The Clairman of the Board was the la1e Judge Herbert F. Goodrich of Philaddphia from the inception of the Code project until the Editorial Board wa~ succeeded by the Pennanent Editorial Board. Judge Goodrich was the fint Chamoan
of the latter Board and the writer is now seniog in that capacity.
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"This tremendous volume moving with surprising speed
and efficiency from one bank to another within single cities and
towns and between cities and towns over state boundary lines
has created a set of problems which are in no way satisfactorily handled by the commercial acts of 1900."
Should the sales department of a great manufacturer whose products go into every state be obliged to familiarize itself with the individual Codes of all the states which have enacted the "Uniform"
Commercial Code for fear that the supposedly uniform provisions of
the law of sales have been tampered with by local draftsmen? Should
the officers of a bank in a great metropolitan center which has correspondents a,ll over the United States be obliged to exercise care in
dealing with banks in other states which have enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code lest they overlook some non-uniform amendment
which has been made in a particular state? Does not state individualism in the enactment of the Code destroy much of the value which the
Code would otherwise have? And finally, in how many instances are
non-uniform amendments made by individual states without consultation with the Code's Editorial Board, of major importance?
To -the first two questions the obvious answer is "no"; to the third
question the obvious answer is ..yes"; and to the final question an examination of the typical article as nonuniformally amended in eighteen states will inevitably lead to the conclusion that none of the differing amendments was really important.
In this last connection, it may not be out of place to mention the
fact that Pennsylvania, which is by no means the least important of
the fifty states in commercial transactions, has had the Code in force
almost ten yean and has not found it necessary to make a single unofficial amendment.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws intends to pursue real uniformity in the statutory regulation
of commercial transactions unless and until the task becomes hopeless.
States which have the Code on their statute books with a few or many
non-uniform amendments will he urged to eliminate those amendments. And the effort to have our entire fifty states enact the Code as
drafted with the amendments officially promulgated by the Permanent Editorial Board will continue.
We believe that within a very few years every state will have on
ita statute books a: Commercial c.ode which will be approximately 75
per cent uniform. However, that will not satisfy those of us who a,
lawyers see the necessity for uniformity in this area and I fear that it
will not permanently satisfy American business.
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